Autron Protocol
Open identity standard for AI agents with DID, agent cards, delegation, reputation, and escrow.
0Tools
15Findings
0Stars
Mar 22, 2026Last Scanned
5 critical · 7 high · 2 medium · 1 low findings detected
Security Category Deep Dive
Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output
Findings15
5critical
7high
2medium
1low
Critical5
criticalQ11Code Suggestion Poisoning via MCPMCP01-prompt-injectionAML.T0054.001
Pattern "(?:suggest|generate|complete|insert).*(?:code|function|class|import|require)" matched in source_code: "generateKeypair, sign, verify, publicKeyToMultibase, multibaseToPublicKey, keyToJWK, jwkToKey, ALG_JWS, ALG_FROM_JWS } = require" (at position 54)
MCP tool outputs flowing into IDE code suggestion contexts must be sanitized. Implement output content policies that: (1) strip hidden Unicode characters (zero-width, RTL override, tag characters), (2) detect embedded instructions targeting AI code assistants, (3) validate code blocks against security patterns before they enter the suggestion pipeline, (4) never include shell commands in tool outputs without explicit [COMMAND] markers visible to the user. Reference: IDEsaster (Dec 2025), arXiv 2509.22040.
criticalK8Cross-Boundary Credential SharingMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(return|respond|output|result).*(?:token|credential|api[_\s-]?key|secret|password|bearer)" matched in source_code: "return sendError(res, 400, 'Missing token" (at position 7280)
Never forward, share, or embed credentials across trust boundaries. Use OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693) to create scoped, delegated tokens instead of passing original credentials. Never include credentials in tool responses. Required by ISO 27001 A.5.17 and OWASP ASI03.
criticalC1Command InjectionMCP03-command-injectionAML.T0054
Pattern "`[^`]+`" matched in source_code: "`http://${req.headers.host || 'localhost'}`" (at position 6397)
Replace exec()/execSync() with execFile() and pass arguments as an array, never as a string. Validate all inputs against an allowlist before use in any shell context. For subprocess.run, always pass a list and shell=False.
criticalN15JSON-RPC Method Name ConfusionMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:method|action)\s*[:=]\s*(?:(?:req|params|body|message|data)\s*\.\s*method)(?!.*(?:allowedMethods|ALLOWED_METHODS|whitelist|allowlist|switch\s*\(|includes\(|has\())" matched in source_code: "method = req.method" (at position 6484)
Validate all JSON-RPC method names against an explicit allowlist. Do not use dynamic dispatch (obj[method]()) for method routing — an attacker can invoke internal methods not intended for external access. Separate tool invocation (tools/call) from protocol methods (initialize, ping). Validate that tools/call only dispatches to registered tool names. Reference: JSON-RPC 2.0 Section 4.1, CWE-749 (Exposed Dangerous Method).
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "["']@modelcontextprotocol/sdk["']\s*:\s*["'](?:\^|~|\*|latest)" matched in source_code: ""@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^" (at position 19627)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
High7
highN10Incomplete Handshake Denial of ServiceMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:createServer|listen)\s*\((?!.*(?:maxConnections|maxClients|connectionLimit|MAX_CONN))" matched in source_code: "createServer(" (at position 18164)
Enforce a handshake timeout (recommended: 30 seconds) — terminate connections that do not complete the initialize handshake within the deadline. Limit maximum concurrent pending connections. An attacker can exhaust server connection slots by initiating MCP connections without completing the handshake (Slowloris-style attack). Reference: MCP spec 2025-03-26 lifecycle — initialize MUST complete before functional requests.
highO6Server Fingerprinting via Error ResponsesMCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0057
Pattern "catch\s*\([^)]*\)\s*\{[^}]*(?:res\.(?:send|json)|return).*(?:err(?:or)?\.(?:message|stack|code)|connection|host|port|database)" matched in source_code: "catch (err) {
return sendJSON(res, 200, { valid: false, error: err.message" (at position 9077)
Never expose process, OS, runtime, or database metadata in tool responses or error messages. Use generic error messages ("An error occurred") for production responses. Remove or disable debug/diagnostic endpoints. If health endpoints are needed, limit them to simple "ok"/"error" status without infrastructure details. Wrap all error handlers with a sanitization layer that strips system information.
highQ15A2A/MCP Protocol Boundary ConfusionMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:discover|register|advertise).*(?:agent|skill|capability)(?!.*(?:verify|auth|sign|trust))" matched in source_code: "discoverAgent" (at position 1087)
Servers bridging A2A and MCP protocols must: (1) sanitize all A2A task metadata before passing to MCP tool inputs, (2) apply MCP content policies to A2A TextPart/FilePart/DataPart content, (3) validate A2A push notifications before they re-enter MCP context, (4) require cryptographic verification for agent discovery and registration (prevent fake agent advertisement — arXiv 2602.19555), (5) maintain separate permission models for A2A and MCP operations — trust in one protocol must not automatically grant trust in the other.
highC3Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)MCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0057
Pattern "new\s+URL\s*\(\s*(?:req|request|input|param|params|args|url|uri|href|link|target|destination|endpoint|host|address|resource|src|source)" matched in source_code: "new URL(req" (at position 6380)
Validate ALL user-supplied URLs before making HTTP requests:
1. Parse the URL and check the hostname against an explicit allowlist of permitted domains.
2. Block requests to RFC 1918 private ranges: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16.
3. Block loopback (127.0.0.0/8), link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and IPv6 equivalents.
4. Block file:// and other non-http(s) protocols explicitly.
5. Disable automatic redirect following, or re-validate each redirect destination.
6. In cloud environments: block requests to IMDS endpoints (169.254.169.254,
metadata.google.internal) at both the application AND network layer.
Example (Node.js): Use the `ssrf-req-filter` package or implement URL validation
against an allowlist before calling fetch/axios/got.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "vitest@3.0.0" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highK15Multi-Agent Collusion PreconditionsMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(agent|delegate).*(?:send|receive|message|communicate)(?!.*(?:log|audit|trace|record|monitor))" matched in source_code: "delegate) return send" (at position 10709)
Implement collusion-resistant multi-agent architecture: (1) Verify agent identity cryptographically before accepting commands, (2) Apply ACLs to shared write surfaces, (3) Rate-limit cross-agent invocations, (4) Audit all inter-agent communication with timestamps and agent IDs, (5) Baseline normal interaction patterns for anomaly detection. Required by MAESTRO L7 and CoSAI MCP-T9.
highK16Unbounded Recursion / Missing Depth LimitsMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "function\s+(\w+).*\{[^}]*\1\s*\((?!.*(?:depth|level|limit|max|count|recursi))" matched in source_code: "function requireSelfAuth(req) {
const info = authSelf(req);
if (info.did !== did) {
throw new AuthError(" (at position 6041)
Add explicit depth/recursion limits to all recursive operations. Use iterative approaches where possible. Set maximum depth for directory walking (max_depth=10), tree traversal (max_level=20), and agent re-invocation (max_calls=5). Implement circuit breakers that halt after N iterations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 (robustness) and OWASP ASI08.
Medium2
mediumK17Missing Timeout or Circuit BreakerMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:fetch|axios|got|request|urllib|httpx|http\.get|http\.post)\s*\((?!.*(?:timeout|signal|AbortSignal|deadline|cancel))" matched in source_code: "Request(" (at position 5452)
Add timeouts to ALL external calls: HTTP requests (30s), database queries (10s), subprocess execution (60s), and MCP tool calls (30s). Implement circuit breakers that open after N consecutive failures (e.g., opossum, cockatiel). Use AbortSignal for cancellable operations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 and OWASP ASI08.
mediumC6Error LeakageMCP09-logging-monitoring
Pattern "catch\s*\([^)]*\)\s*\{[^}]*(?:throw|return).*(?:err|error)\.(?:message|stack)" matched in source_code: "catch (err) {
return sendJSON(res, 200, { valid: false, error: err.message" (at position 9077)
Return generic error messages to clients. Log detailed errors server-side. Never expose stack traces, file paths, or internal error details in responses.
Low1
lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.