Discord (Vencord Bridge)
Accesses Discord through a Vencord plugin bridge for messages, channels, voice, and server management.
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7Findings
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Mar 24, 2026Last Scanned
Findings7
2critical
3high
1medium
1low
0informational
criticalC1Command InjectionMCP03-command-injectionAML.T0054
Pattern "execSync\s*\(" matched in source_code: "execSync(" (at position 780)
Replace exec()/execSync() with execFile() and pass arguments as an array, never as a string. Validate all inputs against an allowlist before use in any shell context. For subprocess.run, always pass a list and shell=False.
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "["']@modelcontextprotocol/sdk["']\s*:\s*["'](?:\^|~|\*|latest)" matched in source_code: ""@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^" (at position 15406)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
highK4Missing Human Confirmation for Destructive OpsMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:execute|run|perform|call).*(?:delete|remove|drop|truncate|destroy)(?!.*(?:confirm|approve|prompt|ask|verify))" matched in source_code: "callPlugin("delete" (at position 5899)
All destructive operations (delete, drop, overwrite, send) MUST include a human confirmation step. Use the MCP destructiveHint annotation to signal that client-side confirmation is required. Implement an approval gate pattern: preview changes → request confirmation → execute. Required by ISO 42001 A.9.1, EU AI Act Art. 14, and NIST AI RMF GOVERN 1.7.
highN10Incomplete Handshake Denial of ServiceMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:wss?\.on|ws\.on|socket\.on)\s*\(\s*['"](?:connection|open|connect)(?!.*(?:setTimeout|handshake[_\s-]?timeout|initTimeout))" matched in source_code: "wss.on("connection" (at position 1198)
Enforce a handshake timeout (recommended: 30 seconds) — terminate connections that do not complete the initialize handshake within the deadline. Limit maximum concurrent pending connections. An attacker can exhaust server connection slots by initiating MCP connections without completing the handshake (Slowloris-style attack). Reference: MCP spec 2025-03-26 lifecycle — initialize MUST complete before functional requests.
highN3JSON-RPC Request ID CollisionMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:requestId|request_id|reqId|id)\s*[:=]\s*(?:(?:\+\+|\-\-)|(?:count|counter|sequence|seq|next))" matched in source_code: "id = ++" (at position 2461)
Use cryptographically random or UUID-based request IDs to prevent collision attacks. Do not use sequential integers — an attacker can predict the next ID and inject a response before the legitimate server responds (response spoofing). Validate that response IDs match pending request IDs. Reference: JSON-RPC 2.0 Section 4.1 — 'id' must be unique within a session.
mediumK17Missing Timeout or Circuit BreakerMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:fetch|axios|got|request|urllib|httpx|http\.get|http\.post)\s*\((?!.*(?:timeout|signal|AbortSignal|deadline|cancel))" matched in source_code: "fetch (" (at position 6216)
Add timeouts to ALL external calls: HTTP requests (30s), database queries (10s), subprocess execution (60s), and MCP tool calls (30s). Implement circuit breakers that open after N consecutive failures (e.g., opossum, cockatiel). Use AbortSignal for cancellable operations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 and OWASP ASI08.
lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.
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Security Category Deep Dive
Sub-Category Tree · Remediation Roadmap · Attack Stories · Compliance Overlay · ATLAS Techniques · Maturity Model
Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output