mcp-mem.ai-cfw

Cloudflare Worker MCP server for Mem.ai - Edge-deployed intelligent memory platform with OAuth protection

maplehilllabsai-mlTypeScriptMIT
0Tools
17Findings
3Stars
Mar 22, 2026Last Scanned
6 critical · 9 high · 1 medium · 1 low findings detected

Security Category Deep Dive

Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
PI-DIRDirect Input Injection
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
PI-INDIndirect / Gateway Injection
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
PI-CTXContext Manipulation
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
PI-ENCEncoding & Obfuscation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
PI-TPLTemplate & Output Poisoning
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output
Framework Coverage
OWASP MCP Top 1014/14
MITRE ATLAS14/14
CoSAI MCP2/14
OWASP Agentic Top 1012/14
Kill Chain Phases
0Initial Access
0Defense Evasion
0Execution
0Persistence

Findings17

6critical
9high
1medium
1low

Critical6

criticalC1Command InjectionMCP03-command-injectionAML.T0054
Pattern "`[^`]+`" matched in source_code: "`github_state:${githubState}`" (at position 1711)
Replace exec()/execSync() with execFile() and pass arguments as an array, never as a string. Validate all inputs against an allowlist before use in any shell context. For subprocess.run, always pass a list and shell=False.
criticalK5Auto-Approve / Bypass Confirmation PatternMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "(auto|automatic)[_\s-]?(approv|confirm|accept|consent|yes)" matched in source_code: "auto-approv" (at position 10285)
Never auto-approve or bypass human confirmation for operations with side effects. Implement explicit confirmation gates that cannot be programmatically bypassed. If batch/CI mode is needed, require an explicit opt-in flag with audit logging. Required by EU AI Act Art. 14 (human oversight) and OWASP ASI09.
criticalK8Cross-Boundary Credential SharingMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(return|respond|output|result).*(?:token|credential|api[_\s-]?key|secret|password|bearer)" matched in source_code: "return new Response("Invalid token" (at position 5035)
Never forward, share, or embed credentials across trust boundaries. Use OAuth token exchange (RFC 8693) to create scoped, delegated tokens instead of passing original credentials. Never include credentials in tool responses. Required by ISO 27001 A.5.17 and OWASP ASI03.
criticalQ11Code Suggestion Poisoning via MCPMCP01-prompt-injectionAML.T0054.001
Pattern "(?:suggest|generate|complete|insert).*(?:code|function|class|import|require)" matched in source_code: "generate auth code" (at position 3555)
MCP tool outputs flowing into IDE code suggestion contexts must be sanitized. Implement output content policies that: (1) strip hidden Unicode characters (zero-width, RTL override, tag characters), (2) detect embedded instructions targeting AI code assistants, (3) validate code blocks against security patterns before they enter the suggestion pipeline, (4) never include shell commands in tool outputs without explicit [COMMAND] markers visible to the user. Reference: IDEsaster (Dec 2025), arXiv 2509.22040.
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "["']@modelcontextprotocol/sdk["']\s*:\s*["'](?:\^|~|\*|latest)" matched in source_code: ""@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^" (at position 12958)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
criticalQ9Agentic Workflow DAG ManipulationMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0058
Pattern "(?:next[_\s]?(?:step|node|agent)|route[_\s]?to|redirect[_\s]?to|skip[_\s]?(?:step|node|validation))" matched in source_code: "redirect to" (at position 1600)
MCP tools must NOT modify agentic workflow graphs, execution order, or routing during runtime. Workflow structure should be immutable once execution begins. If dynamic workflow modification is required, implement: (1) approval gates that require human confirmation before graph mutations, (2) integrity checks that validate the workflow graph against a known-good baseline after each step, (3) audit logging of all graph modifications with rollback capability. Reference: arXiv 2602.19555, Trend Micro subgraph impersonation attack (2026).

High9

highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "hono@4.5.0" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.17.1" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "wrangler@4.28.0" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highK1Absent Structured LoggingMCP09-logging-monitoringAML.T0054
Pattern "console\.(log|warn|error)\s*\(.*(?:tool|request|handler|execute|invoke)" matched in source_code: "console.log("Authorization request" (at position 834)
Implement structured logging (pino, winston, or equivalent) for all tool call handlers. Every tool invocation should log: timestamp, tool name, caller identity, parameters (sanitized), result status, and duration. Required by ISO 27001 A.8.15, CoSAI MCP-T12, and NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6.
highK13Unsanitized Tool OutputMCP02-tool-poisoningAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:fetch|axios|requests?\.get|http\.get).*(?:return|respond|result|body|text|data)(?!.*(?:sanitize|escape|encode|strip|validate|parse|extract))" matched in source_code: "fetch(request: Request, env: Env, ctx: ExecutionContext" (at position 8474)
Sanitize all external data before including in tool responses. Implement output encoding that neutralizes prompt injection patterns. Truncate excessively long content. Validate structure before passing database results. Apply the principle: treat all external data as untrusted, even in tool outputs. Required by CoSAI MCP-T4.
highK4Missing Human Confirmation for Destructive OpsMCP06-excessive-permissionsAML.T0054
Pattern "(auto[_\s-]?execute|auto[_\s-]?approve|skip[_\s-]?confirm|no[_\s-]?prompt)" matched in source_code: "Auto-approve" (at position 11343)
All destructive operations (delete, drop, overwrite, send) MUST include a human confirmation step. Use the MCP destructiveHint annotation to signal that client-side confirmation is required. Implement an approval gate pattern: preview changes → request confirmation → execute. Required by ISO 42001 A.9.1, EU AI Act Art. 14, and NIST AI RMF GOVERN 1.7.
highC3Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)MCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0057
Pattern "\bfetch\s*\(\s*(?:req|request|input|param|params|args|url|uri|href|link|target|destination|endpoint|host|address|resource|src|source|location|proxy|callback|userUrl|user_url|externalUrl|external_url|redirectUrl|redirect_url)" matched in source_code: "fetch(req" (at position 642)
Validate ALL user-supplied URLs before making HTTP requests: 1. Parse the URL and check the hostname against an explicit allowlist of permitted domains. 2. Block requests to RFC 1918 private ranges: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16. 3. Block loopback (127.0.0.0/8), link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and IPv6 equivalents. 4. Block file:// and other non-http(s) protocols explicitly. 5. Disable automatic redirect following, or re-validate each redirect destination. 6. In cloud environments: block requests to IMDS endpoints (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal) at both the application AND network layer. Example (Node.js): Use the `ssrf-req-filter` package or implement URL validation against an allowlist before calling fetch/axios/got.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "agents@0.0.111" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "@cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider@0.0.4" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.

Medium1

mediumK17Missing Timeout or Circuit BreakerMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:fetch|axios|got|request|urllib|httpx|http\.get|http\.post)\s*\((?!.*(?:timeout|signal|AbortSignal|deadline|cancel))" matched in source_code: "fetch(" (at position 642)
Add timeouts to ALL external calls: HTTP requests (30s), database queries (10s), subprocess execution (60s), and MCP tool calls (30s). Implement circuit breakers that open after N consecutive failures (e.g., opossum, cockatiel). Use AbortSignal for cancellable operations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 and OWASP ASI08.

Low1

lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.