SiteProof by Deveras
Scans websites for WCAG accessibility issues, AI engine optimization, and AI agent security compliance via Deveras.
0Tools
15Findings
1Stars
—Downloads
Mar 22, 2026Last Scanned
Findings15
4critical
8high
2medium
1low
0informational
criticalC1Command InjectionMCP03-command-injectionAML.T0054
Pattern "`[^`]+`" matched in source_code: "`${env.SITEPROOF_API_URL}${path}`" (at position 1267)
Replace exec()/execSync() with execFile() and pass arguments as an array, never as a string. Validate all inputs against an allowlist before use in any shell context. For subprocess.run, always pass a list and shell=False.
criticalJ7OpenAPI Specification Field InjectionMCP03-command-injectionAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:summary|operationId|description).*\$\{|`.*(?:summary|operationId)" matched in source_code: "summary.push(`### Issues Found (${" (at position 9484)
Sanitize all OpenAPI specification fields before using them in code generation or template interpolation. Treat summary, description, operationId, and extension fields as untrusted input. Use parameterized templates instead of string interpolation. See CVE-2026-22785/23947.
criticalQ11Code Suggestion Poisoning via MCPMCP01-prompt-injectionAML.T0054.001
Pattern "(?:suggest|generate|complete|insert).*(?:code|function|class|import|require)" matched in source_code: "suggestion — Code" (at position 553)
MCP tool outputs flowing into IDE code suggestion contexts must be sanitized. Implement output content policies that: (1) strip hidden Unicode characters (zero-width, RTL override, tag characters), (2) detect embedded instructions targeting AI code assistants, (3) validate code blocks against security patterns before they enter the suggestion pipeline, (4) never include shell commands in tool outputs without explicit [COMMAND] markers visible to the user. Reference: IDEsaster (Dec 2025), arXiv 2509.22040.
criticalQ13MCP Bridge Package Supply Chain AttackMCP10-supply-chainAML.T0054
Pattern "["']@modelcontextprotocol/sdk["']\s*:\s*["'](?:\^|~|\*|latest)" matched in source_code: ""@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^" (at position 25097)
MCP bridge packages (mcp-remote, mcp-proxy, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, fastmcp) are high-value supply chain targets — CVE-2025-6514 (CVSS 9.6) in mcp-remote affected 437,000+ installs. Always pin exact versions (no ^ or ~ ranges). Use lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, uv.lock). Never run `npx mcp-remote` without version pinning. Verify package integrity with `npm audit` or `pip-audit` before deployment. Reference: CVE-2025-6514, OWASP ASI04.
highC7Wildcard CORSMCP07-insecure-config
Pattern "Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*" matched in source_code: "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*" (at position 24039)
Replace wildcard CORS with an explicit allowlist of permitted origins. Wildcard CORS allows any website to make requests to the MCP server.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.12.1" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "wrangler@4.6.0" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highK15Multi-Agent Collusion PreconditionsMCP05-privilege-escalationAML.T0054
Pattern "(agent|delegate).*(?:send|receive|message|communicate)(?!.*(?:log|audit|trace|record|monitor))" matched in source_code: "agent config: ${err.message" (at position 15706)
Implement collusion-resistant multi-agent architecture: (1) Verify agent identity cryptographically before accepting commands, (2) Apply ACLs to shared write surfaces, (3) Rate-limit cross-agent invocations, (4) Audit all inter-agent communication with timestamps and agent IDs, (5) Baseline normal interaction patterns for anomaly detection. Required by MAESTRO L7 and CoSAI MCP-T9.
highC3Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)MCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0057
Pattern "\bfetch\s*\(\s*(?:req|request|input|param|params|args|url|uri|href|link|target|destination|endpoint|host|address|resource|src|source|location|proxy|callback|userUrl|user_url|externalUrl|external_url|redirectUrl|redirect_url)" matched in source_code: "fetch(url" (at position 1322)
Validate ALL user-supplied URLs before making HTTP requests:
1. Parse the URL and check the hostname against an explicit allowlist of permitted domains.
2. Block requests to RFC 1918 private ranges: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16.
3. Block loopback (127.0.0.0/8), link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and IPv6 equivalents.
4. Block file:// and other non-http(s) protocols explicitly.
5. Disable automatic redirect following, or re-validate each redirect destination.
6. In cloud environments: block requests to IMDS endpoints (169.254.169.254,
metadata.google.internal) at both the application AND network layer.
Example (Node.js): Use the `ssrf-req-filter` package or implement URL validation
against an allowlist before calling fetch/axios/got.
highD1Known CVEs in DependenciesMCP08-dependency-vuln
Dependency "agents@0.0.95" has known CVEs:
Update dependencies to versions that patch known CVEs. Run 'npm audit fix' or 'pip-audit' to identify and resolve vulnerable dependencies.
highO6Server Fingerprinting via Error ResponsesMCP04-data-exfiltrationAML.T0057
Pattern "catch\s*\([^)]*\)\s*\{[^}]*(?:res\.(?:send|json)|return).*(?:err(?:or)?\.(?:message|stack|code)|connection|host|port|database)" matched in source_code: "catch (err: any) {
return txt(`Error scanning ${url}: ${err.message" (at position 10681)
Never expose process, OS, runtime, or database metadata in tool responses or error messages. Use generic error messages ("An error occurred") for production responses. Remove or disable debug/diagnostic endpoints. If health endpoints are needed, limit them to simple "ok"/"error" status without infrastructure details. Wrap all error handlers with a sanitization layer that strips system information.
highK13Unsanitized Tool OutputMCP02-tool-poisoningAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:fetch|axios|requests?\.get|http\.get).*(?:return|respond|result|body|text|data)(?!.*(?:sanitize|escape|encode|strip|validate|parse|extract))" matched in source_code: "fetch(request: Request, env: Env, ctx: ExecutionContext" (at position 23796)
Sanitize all external data before including in tool responses. Implement output encoding that neutralizes prompt injection patterns. Truncate excessively long content. Validate structure before passing database results. Apply the principle: treat all external data as untrusted, even in tool outputs. Required by CoSAI MCP-T4.
mediumC6Error LeakageMCP09-logging-monitoring
Pattern "catch\s*\([^)]*\)\s*\{[^}]*(?:throw|return).*(?:err|error)\.(?:message|stack)" matched in source_code: "catch (err: any) {
return txt(`Error scanning ${url}: ${err.message" (at position 10681)
Return generic error messages to clients. Log detailed errors server-side. Never expose stack traces, file paths, or internal error details in responses.
mediumK17Missing Timeout or Circuit BreakerMCP07-insecure-configAML.T0054
Pattern "(?:fetch|axios|got|request|urllib|httpx|http\.get|http\.post)\s*\((?!.*(?:timeout|signal|AbortSignal|deadline|cancel))" matched in source_code: "fetch(" (at position 1322)
Add timeouts to ALL external calls: HTTP requests (30s), database queries (10s), subprocess execution (60s), and MCP tool calls (30s). Implement circuit breakers that open after N consecutive failures (e.g., opossum, cockatiel). Use AbortSignal for cancellable operations. Required by EU AI Act Art. 15 and OWASP ASI08.
lowF4MCP Spec Non-ComplianceMCP07-insecure-config
Server fails MCP spec compliance checks: required:server_name; required:server_version; required:protocol_version; recommended:tool_descriptions; recommended:parameter_descriptions
Follow the MCP specification for server metadata. Include server name, version, and protocol version. Provide descriptions for all tools and parameters.
Tools
No tools exposed by this server.
Security Category Deep Dive
Sub-Category Tree · Remediation Roadmap · Attack Stories · Compliance Overlay · ATLAS Techniques · Maturity Model
Prompt Injection
Prompt & context manipulation attacks
69
Maturity
14
Rules
5
Sub-Categories
1
Gaps
64%
Implemented
56
Tests
1
Stories
100%3 rules
Injection via tool descriptions and parameter fields
GAP-001Prompt Injection Coverage GapMissing detection coverage for emerging prompt injection attack variants not addressed by current rules
100%4 rules
Hidden instructions via external content and tool responses
100%2 rules
Context window saturation and prior-approval exploitation
100%3 rules
Payload hiding via invisible chars, base64, schema fields
100%2 rules
Injection via prompt templates and runtime tool output