Insufficient coverage

No critical or high issue was observed, but coverage was not sufficient to certify this surface as safe. A findings-free result here reads as insufficient coverage, not safe.

Rescan

Coverage

n/a

Tests run

Findings

0 rules · 0 total

Worst severity

None

Not run on this surface

These rules could not be reached by this scan method. They stay listed and counted, so coverage is never overstated. Each names the input that would unlock it.

183No execution recordNo record that these rules ran on this surface.rescan

Why these stay. The verdict is coverage aware. A clean result would read "Insufficient coverage", not "Safe", precisely because these rules did not run. Hiding them would let a shallow scan look as thorough as a deep one.

Verifiable Findings

Not yet attested

This server has not been scanned with attestation enabled yet.

How to verify this yourself

# Re-run the analyzer on the signed snapshot and recompute the findings digest
curl -s https://mcp-sentinelapi-production.up.railway.app/api/v1/servers/ihateposting/attestation.json > att.json
npx mcp-sentinel verify-scan --attestation att.json

# Prove the attestation is in the public transparency log
curl -s https://mcp-sentinelapi-production.up.railway.app/api/v1/servers/ihateposting/attestation/inclusion.json > incl.json
npx mcp-sentinel transparency verify-inclusion --proof incl.json

Observed behaviorexecuted in sandbox

Declared tool hints vs. what each tool was actually observed to do when executed in our egress-denied sandbox - plus any witnessed tool→tool flow within this one server. This is not cross-server toxic flow, which composes several servers in one config.

Observed behavior not captured for this scan

No observed-behavior record is on file for this server's latest scan.

This is a coverage gap - we did not execute this server’s tools in the sandbox for this scan. It is not a clean result and is not scored as one. To see how observed behavior is rendered when a run does happen, view the illustrative cross-server toxic flow.

Intrinsic here, config-scoped elsewheredual unit

Everything on this page — the verdict, every finding — is iHatePosting assessed on its own. That is its intrinsic posture. Whether it becomes one leg of a cross-server toxic flow is a different, config-scoped question: it depends on which other servers share its client config, and no verdict on this page changes for it.

Registry-wide co-existence →The capability pairs across the registry this server could participate in if co-configured. Hypothetical, CVE-backed templates — not observed here and not an attack path against this deployment.Scan a config →Submit a client config that includes this server to get the real, config-scoped cross-server flow for the servers you actually run together.

Deepen this scan

Every link below opens a form prefilled with this server’s details. Nothing runs until you submit.

Combine with other serversanalyze this server alongside others in one config
Watch it run in a sandboxobserve the published artifact under an egress-denied sandbox